Verbal Magazine

Troubled

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This first book by Anthony Craig offers an impressive analysis of the impact of the Northern Ireland problem on Anglo-Irish relations during the critical years from 1966 to 1974.  There is a particularly strong focus on security matters, as the author surveys British attempts to improve co-operation with the authorities in Dublin in the struggle against the IRA.

In his examination of the outbreak of violence in the North Craig is right to emphasise Harold Wilson’s complete lack of faith in the Stormont administration.  Yet Wilson’s obvious contempt for the Unionist government did not result in greater interference from Westminster.  Instead, Wilson chose to rely on Terence O’Neill to implement a series of political reforms aimed at defusing the growing tension among northern Nationalists.  O’Neill’s failure to carry Unionist dissidents in his own cabinet drew little sympathy from the Labour Prime Minister.  As Craig points out, Wilson’s impatience with the Unionists was, in no small way, due to his belief that the real crux of the Northern Ireland problem was the ‘wrong of partition’.

South of the border, Jack Lynch’s Fianna Fail government was totally unprepared for the dramatic events of August 1969.  Craig is scathing in his criticism of Lynch who, unlike his predecessor Sean Lemass, had little interest in the North.  As Taoiseach, Lynch had to shoulder most of the responsibility for the chaos of Irish government policy after August 1969, though he was clearly not helped by the antics of the Haughey-Blaney faction. 

Not surprisingly, Wilson’s decision to send in the troops drew the British government into much greater involvement in Northern Ireland affairs.  However, Craig argues that Direct Rule should have followed quickly, and an opportunity for political progress was squandered.  Again, Westminster looked to O’Neill’s struggling successors, James Chichester-Clark and Brian Faulkner, to restore calm.  Only when it became clear that this would not happen did Westminster assume full responsibility in March 1972.  The move stunned Faulkner but, as Craig notes, Lynch had been fully briefed on the government’s plans.  By that stage, of course, the events of Bloody Sunday had taken the crisis to a new level.  The author’s assessment of Bloody Sunday is that neither the London nor the Belfast government had any plans for a crackdown on the Derry marchers.  Rather, it was the ‘inevitable’ consequence of ceding greater control over security in the province to the army. 

Ted Heath was another Prime Minister with little interest in Northern Ireland.  Yet, as his most recent biographer confirms, he had the foresight to appreciate that a lasting political settlement in Northern Ireland had to be based on some form of power-sharing.  Craig is forceful in his judgement on the Sunningdale Agreement.  He blames ‘everyone’ for the collapse of the power-sharing executive, though the feeble response of Wilson’s new Labour administration to Unionist extremists deserves to be highlighted.

Craig is equally forthright in his other conclusions.  The British fear of a Protestant backlash was without foundation, but it consistently influenced Westminster policy.  Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution were huge obstacles to progress and contributed to Dublin’s naivety on the border question.  While readers may disagree with some of Dr Craig’s contentions, they may well be swayed by his central argument that in its major dealings with the Irish government Westminster was consistently willing to offer political concessions in return for greater security co-operation.  There is much to ponder in this fine book and it deserves a wide readership.

Russell Rees

Dr Rees is the author of Labour and the Northern Ireland Problem 1945-51: The Missed Opportunity.

Russell Rees

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