Review
Shedding new light on a well documented period, says Russell Rees
- Ambushes and Armour: The Irish Rebellion 1919-1921
- Irish Academic Press
Guerrilla
This new publication by the American historian, William Kautt, complements Charles Townshend’s classic 1975 study which examined the British campaign in Ireland during the War of Independence.
While Townshend’s primary focus was on the failure of British political and military strategy over the course of the campaign, Kautt’s book considers the evolution of the military tactics deployed by both sides during the conflict.
Kautt’s main conclusion is that the British were slow learners. While military forces in conflict situations usually learn through trial and error, the ‘Crown Forces’ in Ireland struggled to adapt to the demands of guerrilla warfare. One reason for this was the British tendency to underestimate their opponents. Incident reports following successful IRA operations consistently emphasised the enemy’s good fortune, and there was little acknowledgement of the effectiveness of IRA flying columns or recognition of the leadership skills displayed by particular IRA commanders.
In sketching the political background to the Irish conflict Kautt is correct in highlighting the impact of increased anti-war sentiment in Britain following the carnage on the Western Front. This, together with the marked rise in liberal thinking, caused public opinion on the mainland to question the government’s coercion policy in Ireland, particularly in 1920-21 when the fighting intensified. Kautt also attributes some of the failure in British military planning in Ireland to the fact that resources were severely stretched after the First World War, as the Lloyd George-led Coalition Government desperately tried to cling to Britain’s imperial past. Yet while he recognises that a lack of political will undermined British security policy in Ireland during the period, the author argues that the Crown Forces expected, and were fully prepared, to continue fighting in the summer of 1921. By that stage, however, the British government was facing a difficult choice between maintaining the status quo, which was clearly failing, or embarking on an all-out war, for which there was little appetite. It was this predicament that persuaded the British to opt for a truce in July 1921.
Much of the book is devoted to a comprehensive analysis of the IRA’s ambush technique. Detailed descriptions and assessments cover a large number of incidents including the notorious Kilmichael ambush on 28 November 1920. While Kautt has nothing to add to the Meda Ryan-Peter Hart debate, he does suggest that Kilmichael had a much more profound influence on republican morale than the events of Bloody Sunday just one week earlier. Kilmichael, the author notes, was ‘a clear victory’ for the IRA, an outcome which the British only belatedly recognised.
Kautt’s evaluation of such engagements and of each side’s ability to adapt to changing military circumstances is strengthened by the author’s own military background and training. This expertise enables the author to view events from the perspective of the ordinary combatant on both sides of the conflict. Consequently, new light is shed on a well documented period of Irish history.
